SECOND DIVISION
|
ROLENDO T.
DELFIN,
Petitioner, - versus - JOSEFINA
L. VALDEZ and JOSE V. LAGON,
Respondents. |
|
G.R. No. 132281 Present: PUNO, Chairperson, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, AZCUNA, GARCIA, JJ.
Promulgated: September
15, 2006 |
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D E C I S I O
N
GARCIA, J.:
In this petition for review under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Rolendo T. Delfin seeks the annulment
and setting aside of the Decision[1]
dated December 16, 1997 of the Court of Appeals (CA), as reiterated in its
Resolution of January 26, 1998,[2] in
CA G.R. CV No. 48751, affirming en toto an earlier decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sultan Kudarat, Branch 19, in an action to quiet
title thereat commenced by the petitioner against the herein respondents,
Josefina L. Valdez and Jose V. Lagon.
The material facts are undisputed:
The spouses Carlos Valdez, Sr. and Josefina
de Leon-Valdez (Josefina, hereafter), were the owners of a parcel of land with
an area of 24,725 square meters located in the commercial district of Isulan,
Sultan Kudarat. The property was
designated as Lot No. 3 of Pls-208-D-13 and covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. T-19529 (T-1902) issued
on
On
Hence, on
On
|
TCT No. |
Lot No. |
Area |
|
16436 |
3-A |
2,586 sq. meters |
|
16437 |
3-B |
2,802 sq. meters |
|
16438 |
3-C |
2,534 sq. meters |
|
16439 |
3-D |
3,198 sq. meters |
|
16440 |
3-E |
3,359 sq. meters |
|
16441 |
3-F |
2,952 sq. meters |
|
16442 |
3-G |
3,650 sq. meters |
|
16443 |
3-H |
3,644 sq. meters |
All the foregoing subdivision titles
were under the name of “Josefina L. Valdez, married to Carlos Valdez, Sr.”
Later, Josefina further caused the
subdivision of Lot No. 3-D covered by TCT No. 16439, resulting in the existence
of Lot No. 3-D-1, containing an area of 1,551 square meters. Lot No. 3-D-1 is
the property involved in this case.
On
It turned out that the area comprising the entirety of Lot No. 3-D-1
(1,551 square meters) which used to be a portion of Lot No. 3-D was already included in the earlier sale of
May 9, 1979 between Josefina and Lagon over the 4,094-square meter portion of
the mother lot, Lot No. 3.
On
For his part, upon
knowing of Civil Case No. 778, Delfin instituted in the same court an action to
quiet title against Josefina and Lagon,
docketed as Civil Case No. 779, now
the subject of the present petition.
On January 20, 1995, the
RTC of Sultan Kudarat, Branch 90, upon its finding that Delfin, albeit a prior
registrant, was a purchaser in bad faith because he allegedly knew the prior
sale between Josefin and Lagon, came out with its decision in Civil Case No. 779, dismissing Delfin’s
complaint for quieting of title and rendering judgment for Lagon, to wit:
WHEREFORE, upon all the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered, dismissing [Delfin’s] complaint.
In [Lagon’s] counterclaim, judgment is hereby rendered:
(a) declaring [Delfin] a purchaser in bad faith, all consequently, a possessor in bad faith of Lot No. 3-D-1 xxx;
(b) declaring [Lagon] to have a superior right to the land in question, identified as Lot No. 3-D-1 xxx, the same being a portion of or is included in the parcel of land priorly purchased by said [Lagon];
(c)
declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale xxx dated
(d) directing the Register of Deeds of Sultan Kudarat to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-20380 in favor of [Delfin], covering the disputed lot xxx, and to issue a new TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE in favor of [Lagon] covering said Lot No. 3-D-1 xxx;
(e) ordering [Delfin], and those acting for and in his behalf to vacate Lot No. 3-D-1 xxx and surrender possession thereof to [Lagon]: [Delfin] may remove his aforementioned improvement from the said lot within TWO (2) MONTHS from the finality of this JUDGMENT, unless [Lagon] elects to acquire the same and pay [Delfin] the amount of TEN (10) THOUSAND PESOS within TWO (2) MONTHS from finality of this JUDGMENT. Should [Lagon] fail to pay the said amount within the said period of TWO (2) MONTHS from the finality of this Judgment, the period of Two (2) Months within which [Delfin] may remove his aforesaid useful improvement, consisting of a building housing the IVY PHARMACY and the Medical Specialist Center shall commence from the expiration of the TWO (2) MONTHS given [Lagon] to pay for the said useful improvement;
(f) ordering [Delfin] to pay [Lagon] the sums of:
1.
P50,000.00 by way of moral and exemplary
damages;
2.
P50,000.00 by way of attorney’s fees;
3.
P30,000.00 by way of litigation expenses;
4.
P43,191.50 representing the actual airplane
transportation expenses incurred by [Lagon’s] lawyer’s attendance during the
trial of the xxx case; and further
ordering [Delfin] to pay the costs of suit.
IT IS SO ORDERED.[4] (Words in brackets added.)
From the above decision
of the RTC, Delfin immediately went on appeal to the CA whereat his appellate
recourse was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
48751.
As stated at the outset
hereof, the CA, in its challenged Decision[5]
dated
1.
when
it ruled that petitioner was a buyer in bad faith proceeding from evidence
which are unsubstantiated, hearsay or mere conjectures;
2.
when
it failed to rule the issue involving [respondent] Josefina L. Valdez, which
was timely raised by petitioner in his appeal brief but effectively brushed
aside by affirmance in toto of the
lower court’s decision;
3.
when
it did not leave the parties where they are under the doctrine of pari
delicto, which was timely raised as a question of law in his appeal brief;
4.
in
awarding by way of reconveyance to respondent Lagon the subject property not
originally pleaded in his counterclaim; and
5.
in
affirming the award of damages not supported by substantial evidence.
We GRANT the petition, but upon a different ground.
From the very opening statement of
the appellate court in the decision under review, it is obvious that said court,
along with the court below it, resolved the controversy on the premise that there
exists a case of double sale. On that premise, the CA and the trial court applied to
this case the provisions of Article 1544 of the Civil Code, which reads:
ART. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first in the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith.
To the two (2) courts below, the two
(2) sales of the lot in question – Lot No. 3-D-1 – are: (1) the sale entered
into on May 9, 1979 between Josefina, through her attorney-in-fact, Atty.
Carlos Valdez, Jr., in favor of Lagon over the 4,094-square meter portion of
the former Lot No. 3 which portion covered the entire area of Lot No. 3-D-1,
referred to herein as the first sale;
and (2) the sale of Lot No. 3-D-1
entered into between Josefina and Delfin on June 4, 1987, hereinafter referred
to as the second sale.
While on the surface, there is
apparently a situation of double sale, in truth and in law, there is only one:
the sale of Lot No. 3-D-1 by Josefina to the petitioner on
The application of Article 1544 of
the Civil Code presupposes the existence of two (2) valid and binding contracts of sale, which, under legal
contemplation, is made possible by the operation of the Torrens System
whereunder registration is the operative act which transfers title or ownership
of a titled property, such that before the first buyer registers his sale to
consolidate ownership and title in his favor, the seller who retains the title
and ownership in the meantime can validly transfer such title and ownership by
way of a second sale to another buyer, who, in case he succeeds in registering
said second sale before he acquired notice of the first sale, can defeat the
rights of the first buyer under Article
1544 of the Civil Code.
With our decision[6] in Josefina L. Valdez and Carlos L. Valdez, Jr.
v. Court of Appeals and Jose Lagon,[7] decided
on
We
quote the Court’s pertinent ruling in the aforesaid case of
The respondent [Lagon]
admitted in his complaint that he undertook to construct the said building and
transfer the Rural Bank of Isulan to the property he had purchased from xxx Josefina.
The respondent [Lagon] affirmed the authenticity and due execution of his
affidavit and his obligations therein, and testified, thus:
ATTY.
Q Mr. Lagon, you testified that according to you the
construction of the same, the PCIB Isulan was a compliance of your obligation
under your contract with the Valdezes, do you recall having testified on that?
A Yes, Sir.
Q With in (sic) how many years, by the say (sic), were
you supposed to comply with that condition by putting up a bank or a commercial
building in that area?
A Supposed to be five years, Sir.
Q From when?
A According to the affidavit, from the time I
purchased the property up to or from May 9, 1979 to 1984, Sir.
xxx xxx xxx
In
his letter to xxx Carlos, Jr., [Lagon], through counsel, admitted the binding
effect of his affidavit as follows:
It is hereby submitted
therefore that there is in effect substantial compliance on the part of Mr.
Lagon with regards to the additional condition laid down in his affidavit
herein-referred to. If you deem it that Mr. Lagon has not satisfactorily
complied with all the obligations you imposed upon him to do thereunder, it is
made to reasons not of his own making but due to factors brought about by
circumstances then prevailing, and elaboration on the same can only be properly
stated on the proper time to come.
Far from being a mere
affidavit, the document embodies the unequivocal undertaking of [Lagon] to
construct a fully operational commercial building and to transfer the Rural
Bank of Isulan to the subject property as part of the consideration of the sale
within five (5) years from the execution of the deed of sale, or until May 9,
1984.
The intractable refusal
of [Lagon] to pay the balance of the purchase price of the property despite the
petitioners’ (i.e., Josefina and Carlos Valdez, Jr.) demands had no legal
basis. As such, xxx Josefina’s
refusal to deliver the torrens title over the subject property under xxx
[Lagon's] name was justified, precisely because of xxx [Lagon's] refusal to comply with his
obligation to pay the balance of the purchase price. Had xxx [Lagon] paid the
purchase price of the property, such failure on the part of xxx Josefina to
deliver the torrens title to and under the name of [Lagon] would have warranted
the suspension of the five-year period agreed upon for the construction of a
fully operational commercial building, as well as the transfer of the aforesaid
bank to the property. This is so because absent such torrens title under the
name of xxx [Lagon], no building permit for the construction of the buildings
could be secured.
Considering all the
foregoing, the failure of xxx [Lagon] to cause the construction of the
commercial building and the transfer of the bank to the property
sold under the deed of sale executed between him and xxx
Josefina was due to xxx [Lagon's] own
fault.
There was no need for
xxx Josefina to make a notarized demand
to xxx [Lagon] or file an action to rescind the deed of absolute sale to enable
her to recover the ownership of the property. This is so because xxx Josefina and
xxx [Lagon] had agreed that upon [his] failure to construct a new and fully
operational commercial building and to cause the transfer of the Rural Bank of
Isulan to the property on or before May 9, 1984, the deed of absolute sale
would be deemed null and void without need of any demand from xxx [Josefina and
Atty. Calos Valdes, Jr. Such agreement is evidenced by the affidavit executed
by xxx [Lagon] himself on
We do not agree with xxx
[Lagon's] contentions that xxx Josefina
through her son and attorney-in-fact xxx Carlos, Jr., had agreed to the
sale of a portion of the property, the construction of the PCIB branch office
thereon, and the crediting of the amount paid by the PCIB to xxx [Lagon's]
account, and deducted from the balance of the purchase price. In the
first place, xxx [Lagon] failed to adduce a morsel of evidence that xxx
Josefina had knowledge of the said agreement and had agreed thereto.
Furthermore, xxx [Lagon] failed to adduce documentary evidence that xxx
Josefina authorized her son and attorney-in-fact to enter into such an
agreement.
It bears stressing that xxx
[Josefina] specifically and unequivocally required in the special power of
attorney, as part of the consideration of the sale of the property to xxx [Lagon],
the latter’s obligation to construct a new and fully operational commercial
building and transfer the Rural Bank of Isulan to the property. Had she agreed
to modify the Special Power of Attorney she executed in favor of her son, xxx Carlos,
Jr., for sure, she would have executed a document to that effect. She did
not do so. xxx Carlos, Jr. could not lawfully bind xxx Josefina thereon
because he was not so authorized to enter into such an agreement with xxx
[Lagon]; neither can such authority be implied from the Special Power of
Attorney xxx Josefina executed in favor
of her son, xxx Carlos, Jr.
In sum, then, xxx
[Lagon] had no cause for specific performance against xxx [Josefina and Carlos
Valdez, Jr.] However, xxx [Josefina and Carlos Valdez, Jr.] are
obliged to refund to xxx [Lagon] the latter’s partial payments for the subject
property. (Words in brackets and parenthesis added; Emphasis supplied)
Clear it is from the above that on
account of Lagon’s failure to comply with the terms and conditions of the so-called first sale, this Court deemed that sale “null and void”
without need of any demand from Josefina and her son Carlos Valdez, Jr. for Lagon to comply with
the agreed terms and conditions attendant to that so-called first sale.
With the reality that this Court in Valdez deemed the so-called first sale as null and void by reason of
Lagon’s breach of the express terms and conditions relative thereto before the second sale was entered into by and
between Josefina and Delfin, the provisions of Article 1544 of the Civil Code
on double sales do not apply. Josefina had full
and complete ownership over the subject lot (Lot No. 3-D-1) at the time of the
second sale, the obligation to return
to Lagon the sum of money originally received by her from the latter notwithstanding.
This title and ownership of Lot No. 3-D-1 was effectively transferred from
Josefina to Delfin with the issuance of a clean new transfer certificate of
title in the name of Delfin upon the registration of the second sale.
Finding the inapplicability of
Article 1544 of the Civil Code to the present case, we see no need to address the
legal issues raised in this petition for
having become moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and the assailed CA Decision and
Resolution are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered
quieting the title of petitioner Rolendo
T. Delfin over Lot No. 3-D-1, now covered by TCT No. 20380 in his name, and DISMISSING all counterclaims in Civil Case No. 779.
Costs against respondent
Jose V. Lagon.
SO ORDERED.
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
|
ANGELINA
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate Justice |
RENATO
C. CORONA Associate Justice |
ADOLFO
S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
A
T T E S T A T I O N
I
attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
REYNATO
S .PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
C
E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant
to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court.
ARTEMIO
V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice
Oswaldo D. Agcaoili (now ret.) with
Associate Justice Fidel P. Purisima (now a retired member of this Court) and
Associate Justice Corona Ibay-Somera (now ret.), concurring; rollo, 53-73.
[2]
[3]
[4] Reproduced from the CA decision of
[5] Supra note 1.
[6] Penned by Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., with the concurrence of Senior Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno and Associate Justices Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez, Dante O. Tinga and Minita V. Chico-Nazario.
[7] Supra note 3.